What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other by Gelpern, Anna
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2005 
What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other 
Anna Gelpern 
Georgetown University Law Center, ag1348@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 391 (2005-2006) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Finance Commons, International Economics Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and 
Economics Commons 
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Anna Gelpern*
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial collapse usually triggers a flurry of market, academic, and policy
innovation.' The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s produced the Brady
Bonds and led to the rise of today's emerging markets. In the late 1990s, crises in
Pakistan, Ecuador, and Ukraine helped teach the markets how to restructure
international sovereign bonds.2 Crises in Mexico, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and
throughout East Asia raised doubts about the international system's ability to
manage vast and rapid capital flows, and prompted a big-picture reassessment
under the rubric "international financial architecture." This included most
famously the sovereign bankruptcy proposals discussed elsewhere in this
volume.
The sovereign debt workouts now underway in Iraq and Argentina
continue this trend. Each country is trying to restructure more than $100 billion
in defaulted external debt this year-perhaps before this Essay goes to print.
Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. I am grateful to Robert
Ahdieh, Bill Bratton, Anupam Chander, Caroline Gentile, G. Mitu Gulati, Brad Setser, and Edwin
M. Truman for valuable comments, and to Carol Roehrenbeck, Renee Cullman and the staff at
the Rutgers-Newark law library for help with the research. I thank Peter Kenen and Elise Carlson
Lewis for the opportunity to present an early version of this essay at the TAF Annual Conference
at the Council on Foreign Relations in October 2004. Although I have advised emerging markets
companies holding Iraqi debt, the views expressed in this article are my own and without
reference to the views of any client. Errors and omissions are all mine.
I See Lee C. Buchheit, How to Negotiate Eurocurrengy Loan Agreements 16 (Euromoney 1995). For
reform proposals in the wake of Mexico's "Tequila Crisis," see Barry Eichengreen and Richard
Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Order# Workouts for Sovereign Debtors (Centre for Econ Poly Rsrch 1995);
see also James Hurlock and Troy Alexander, The Fire Next Time: The Dangers in the Next Debt Crisis,
15 Intl Fin L Rev 14 (1996). For a comprehensive survey of the crises and lessons of the 1990s,
see Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-Ins: Responding to Financial Crises in Emecging
Economies ch 4 (Inst Ind Econ 2004).
2 See Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, 19 Intl Fin L Rev 17 (2000) and Lee
C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L Rev 59
(2000).
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Each may fail, leaving the debts unresolved for years. A full study of the law
emerging out of the two restructurings must await their completion, and will
likely take volumes. This Essay focuses on several early data points that Iraq and
Argentina offer for the law of sovereign debt, and suggests lessons that the two
cases might hold for each other and for future restructurings.
The two cases are rarely mentioned together.3 Most think of Argentina as
the quintessential case of financial globalization gone awry-a lapsed market
reformer that sank under the weight of (depending on your perspective)
misguided liberalization or its own financial chutzpah,4 and took with it Argentine
depositors, Italian retirees, Japanese banks, and offshore investment funds.
Iraq's debt has a distinctly "preglobalization" flavor. Most of its obligations date
back to the 1970s and 1980s, before the recent wave of financial liberalization.
Iraq's money troubles came to light after three wars, a quarter-century of
dictatorship, and over a decade of financial isolation under international
sanctions. In the words of Iraq's own advisers, its debt restructuring is a
"quintessential geopolitical case, a classic outlier" framed by strategic more than
financial concerns.'
Aside from the obvious intuition that no case of government debt is
immune from politics and no multibillion dollar restructuring is devoid of
finance, Argentina and Iraq appear to be on opposite ends of the finance-politics
spectrum. Despite, or because of this distance between them, each of these two
restructurings offers insights for policy and doctrinal problems normally
associated with the other. I focus on two such problems: shielding sovereign
debtors from lawsuits, now most acutely associated with Argentina,6 and
restructuring debts inherited from bad regimes, such as those Iraq had incurred
under Saddam Hussein.
The first half of this Essay surveys recent efforts to protect governments
from private creditor lawsuits in national courts. The general shield already in
place-a bundle of sovereign immunities that have inspired a rich literature7 -
has looked increasingly fragile in the wake of emerging sovereign bond crises, an
impression reinforced by hundreds of lawsuits against Argentina. But the project
of bolstering these protections, which culminated in the IMF's statutory
3 For one exception, see Felix Salmon, Seeking Foigiveness of Saddam-era Debt, 35 Euromoney 72, 76
(Sept 2004).
4 Michael Mussa, Polig Analyses in International Economics 67, Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to
Tragedy 41 (Inst Intl Eeon 2002).
5 Lee C. Buchheit, Lecture on Restructuring Iraqi Debt, New York Law School (Mar 30, 2005).
6 Argentina Delays Debt Swap, Awaits US Court Ruling, Reuters (Mar 31, 2005).
See, for example, Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of Offidal Sector in Sovereign Workouts, 6 Chi J Intl L 333
(2005).
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sovereign bankruptcy proposal, kept running into political and technical
constraints that looked insurmountable. In the case of Iraq, the United Nations
dispensed with these constraints and granted broad new immunities for Iraqi
assets, all but destroying the prospect of near-term recovery from litigation.
In the second half, I look at the Odious Debt Doctrine, which is
experiencing a revival after regime change in Iraq.8 The doctrine is often cited
for the proposition that the countries emerging from nasty dictatorships can
repudiate their debts, because those debts came about without the consent of or
benefit for their people. But since its invention and throughout the past
century-rife with oppressive regimes, revolutions, reckless borrowings, and
debt defaults-the doctrine has languished in near complete disuse save for an
occasional NGO campaign or bout of parliamentary rhetoric. Just as Iraq is an
unlikely source of lessons for sovereign bankruptcy in the age of financial
globalization, Argentina's experience since 2001 helps explain why governments
do not use the Odious Debt Doctrine to disavow the obligations of their
predecessors.
The cases of Iraq and Argentina suggest that alternative tools to shield
countries from creditor lawsuits and reduce sovereign debts have helped
preempt the emergence of new law in the areas of sovereign bankruptcy and
Odious Debt. The fact that public and private creditors seem to prefer the
existing tools weighs heavily against the new norms.
Together, the two cases illustrate that sovereign borrowers in dire financial
straits inhabit a relatively flexible legal universe, in which they may use a mix of
public, private, legal, and political resources to keep their creditors at bay. The
case of Iraq suggests the outer limits of this flexibility. UN Security Council
Resolutions shielding Iraq from its creditors show that the Great Powers stand
ready to give less fortunate governments extraordinary legal protections in
extreme political circumstances. But only a month before the key UN measure,
its principal backers rejected the IMF's effort to institutionalize much milder
protections in a statutory sovereign bankruptcy regime. The resolutions reaffirm
implicitly the official sector's resistance to establishing sovereign bankruptcy as a
routine financial event or institutionalizing its own entanglement with private
contracts. This policy preference for exceptionalism9 also comports with market
8 See <http://www.odiousdebts.org> (visited Apr 15, 2005); see also <htrp://
www.jubileeiraq.org> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
9 This goes beyond the preference for discretion. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, iisredon, and
Authority in Internalional Finandal Reform, 4 J Intl Econ L 613 (2001).
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preference, reflecting fears that .a standing insolvency regime would diminish
market discipline and encourage sovereign defaults.'0
Examining the two cases side by side also reveals a doctrinal gap in the law
of sovereign debt. The erosion of sovereign immunities since the 1950s exposed
governments to a real risk of creditor lawsuits in national courts. The result was
a boon for the development of private law in an area previously dominated by
foreign ministries." A growing number of countries adapted sophisticated debt
contracts and restructuring techniques used by large corporations. As markets
developed in their debt, countries handled their periodic money problems as a
challenge of financial reorganization, not as international (political) incidents. 2
Public international law seemed to shift behind the scenes, supporting and
lightly guiding the development of private sovereign debt markets. 3
If Argentina succeeds in restructuring its bonds on anything close to the
terms it has announced, it will validate the capacity of this private machinery to
deliver debt reduction. But Iraq is a reminder that financial relief alone may not
be enough-financial restructuring elides fundamental public questions of
governance and responsibility that are the province of domestic corporate and
constitutional law, but that have no easy international counterpart. These
questions lie at the heart of the public international law doctrine of Odious
Debt. While this doctrine is a flawed tool for debt relief in today's markets, it
may be worth reinventing to confront economic damage from corrupt, inept,
and illegitimate governments that persist in every age.
II. IRAQ: BACKDOOR BANKRUPTCY?
On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing
the framework for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Among other
things, Resolution 1483 immunized all of Iraq's oil and gas wealth from legal
10 Hal S. Scott, Market Discipline for Financial Institutions and Sovereigns 11-12 (unpublished draft
manuscript), available online at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/
hscottmarketdiscipline.pdf>; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt,
36 Georgetown J Intl L (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 77-78, on file with author);
<http://www.emcreditors.org> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
1 See, for example, Buchheit, 6 Chi J Intl L at 339 (cited in note 7).
12 See W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International
Law, 10 Yale J Intl L 1 (1984); see also W. Michael Reisman and Andrew R. Willard, eds,
International Incdents: The Law That Counts in World Politics (Princeton 1988).
13 For example, the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors has no legal personality;
agreements among members are documented in the form of nonbinding meeting minutes. Lex
Reiffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinety 56-65, 91-95 (Brookings 2000);
<http://www.clubdeparis.org> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
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process until the end of 2007,"4 and directed all UN member states to freeze the
remaining Iraqi assets in their jurisdictions and transfer them to the
Development Fund for Iraq, internationally supervised and also immune. To
give the UN resolution the force of law in the United States, 6 President Bush
issued Executive Order 13,303 the same day, essentially tracking the Security
Council's language-except that his order had no sunset date. 7
One year and a day later, a joint US-UK draft of another resolution
(marking Iraq's transition to interim self-government) went beyond blocking
enforcement against Iraqi assets-it tried to stay legal proceedings against Iraq.
In the draft, the Security Council:
Calls upon its member states to take appropriate steps within their
respective legal systems to stay for a period of 12 months from 30 June
2004 all legal and other similar proceedings before their courts or other
tribunals involving claims by or against the State of Iraq, its Government, or
14 The operative language reads as follows:
Nofing the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognized,
representative government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt completion
of the restructuring of Iraq's debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above, further
decides that, until December 31, 2007, unless the Council decides otherwise,
petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be
immune, until title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings
against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or
execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under
their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and that
proceeds and obligations arising from sales thereof, as well as the
Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent
to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the above-mentioned
privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any legal proceeding in
which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to satisfy liability
for damages assessed in connection with an ecological accident, including an
oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution.
Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc S/RES/1483 § 22 (May 22, 2003). A subsequent
resolution reaffirmed the basic commitment to immunize Iraqi assets, but carved out from it final
judgments arising from obligations incurred after June 30, 2004 (presumed transfer of
sovereignty). Security Council Res No 1546, UN Doc S/RES/1546 § 27 (June 8, 2004).
15 Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc S/RES/1483 at § 23 (May 22, 2003) (cited in note 14).
16 UN resolutions are not self-executing under US law. See Diggs v Richardson, 555 F2d 848, 850-51
(DC Cir 1976).
17 The President, Exec Order 13,303-Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain
Other Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest, 68 Fed Reg 31931 § 1 (May 28, 2003). In
November 2004, he expanded the order to cover the assets of the Iraqi central bank. The
President, Exec Order 13364-Modifying the Protection Granted to the Development Fund for
Iraq and Certain Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest and Protecting the Central Bank of Iraq,
69 Fed Reg 70177 § 1 (Nov 29, 2004).
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any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including its State-owned enterprises
or similar bodies.18
This provision did not make the final text, 9 perhaps because the drafters
realized it would be both excessive and redundant: excessive for blocking access
to the courts, and redundant since the practical utility of litigation was already
near zero after Resolution 1483.
For those following the sovereign bankruptcy debate, the Iraqi solution
had a Presto! feel to it. With nary a peep from the markets, the UN and its key
member governments effectively immunized a bankrupt sovereign and
implemented the most controversial early aspiration of the IMF's Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), shelved just weeks before. Since oil
production alone accounts for over 75 percent of the Iraqi economy,20 the UN
resolution and perhaps more importantly the US Executive Orders put Iraq's
prime commercial assets outside creditor reach.
This move was radical against the background of sovereign debt workouts
following Mexico's default in 1982. Although major financial powers do not like
messy sovereign defaults-these often trigger costly humanitarian crises,
economic decline, and financial contagion-they also do not normally go around
immunizing other governments to keep private creditors (their own nationals)
from bothering the debtors. Policymakers also jealously guard the preeminence
of their markets and reasonably see respect for contracts as essential to market
function.
The compromise that has addressed these concerns since the 1950s-a
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity-allowed creditors to sue foreign
governments in connection with commercial activities abroad (such as
borrowing money), but did little to help them enforce judgments. 21 A sovereign
18 Security Council Res Draft May 23, 2004, available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/
shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24-05-04iraqdraftscr.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005). It is noteworthy that the
draft would block not only claims against the Iraqi government, but also claims by it.
19 See Security Council Res No 1546, UN Doc S/RES/1546 (une 8, 2004) (cited in note 14).
20 Iraq-Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding 8 (Sept 24, 2004), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2004/
irq/01 /index.htm> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
21 Until the 1950s, sovereigns had enjoyed substantial immunity from litigation. In 1952, the US
executive branch adopted a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, which allowed
governments to be sued in connection with commercial activities, including borrowing money
abroad. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dept St Bull 984, 984-85
(1952). It was later codified in the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the UK State
Immunity Act of 1978, the Singapore State Immunity Act of 1979, the South African Foreign
States Immunity Act of 1981, and the Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, among others. See
Philip Wood, 2 Law and Practice of International Finance §4.02(1), (3) (1990), also surveying case law
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debtor's exposure was limited to the extent it had left nondiplomatic property
lying around for creditors to seize. Since governments proved adept at keeping
valuables away from their creditors, diplomatic and humanitarian fallout from
litigation was contained, albeit not eliminated entirely. The large commercial
banks that dominated sovereign lending in the 1970s and 1980s weighed the
uncertain benefits of suing against the certain costs of disrupting long term
relationships with sovereign clients, and refrained from going to court.
The advent of sovereign debt securitization in the 1990s seemed to
threaten this balance. Bondholders replaced commercial banks as principal
creditors to the sovereigns. Policymakers and some market participants worried
that thousands of atomistic bondholders unconcerned with long term
relationships would rush to the courthouse at the first sign of trouble. 23 This
rush would be akin to a bank run, followed by a global scramble for scant
sovereign assets that would exacerbate a crisis and block its resolution. To
address this new fear, something like an automatic stay in bankruptcy was in
order-a pause on private creditor enforcement that would allow for a collective
deep breath before the work of orderly restructuring begins.24
supporting the restrictive theory. See Scott, Market Disepline for Financial Institutions and Sovereigns
(cited in note 10).
22 For a general discussion, see Jill E. Fisch and Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role
of Liigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L J 1043, 1075-88 (2004); Wood, 2 Law and
Practice of International Finance at § 4.02(5); § 4.06(8), (9) (cited in note 21). In a sense, allowing
lawsuits while limiting enforcement privatized the political pressure tactics that bondholders used
after the defaults of the 1830s and the 1930s to convince recalcitrant sovereigns to pay up. See
Rory MacMillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 Nw J Ind L & Bus 57, 85 (1995).
Instead of dodging diplomats from bondholders' home countries, borrowing authorities now paid
lawyers to dodge liens on their external financial flows. Both are doable; neither is pleasant from
the sovereign's perspective.
23 See Hurlock and Alexander, 15 Intl Fin L Rev 14 (cited in note 1); Group of Ten, The Resolution of
Sovereign Iiquidiy Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors Prepared under the Auspices of the Deuties
(1996), available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.htm> (visited Apr 15, 2005); Report
of the Working Group on International Financial Crises (1998), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/index.htm#crises> (visited Apr 15, 2005); Anne
Krueger, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, International Financial Architecture for 2002: New
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov 26, 2001), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/11260 1 .htm> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
24 Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidiy Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors
Prepared under the Aupices of the Deputies at 21 (cited in note 23). Strictly speaking, neither the
concept of a rush to the courthouse nor the automatic stay analogy was new by the mid-1990s.
Sachs discussed the theoretical possibility of a rush to the courthouse more than a decade earlier,
and shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit raised the possibility of a sovereign "automatic stay"
modeled on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code in its first Allied Bank opinion. Jeffrey Sachs,
Theoretical Issues in International Boroning NBER Working Paper No 1189 (Aug 1983); see also
Allied Bank Intl v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F2d 23 (2d Cir 1984), revd on rehearing, 757
F2d 516 (2d Cir 1985). However, while commercial banks dominated the scene, experience and
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A host of proposals followed, including amendment of the IMF Charter to
sanction sovereign payment suspensions,2" and modification of sovereign bond
contracts to diminish the lure of litigation.26 All these proposals failed partly
because of fierce opposition from private creditors who complained that the
changes would limit their already inadequate remedies.
But the crises kept getting bigger and nastier, and the search for a new
compromise continued, spurred on by the specter of the world's largest
sovereign bond default in Argentina. Early versions of the IMF's SDRM,
unveiled just before Argentina defaulted in late 2001, had three basic elements:
(1) protection from lawsuits-addressing the fear of a rush to the courthouse;
(2) facilitating collective action among large numbers of creditors-addressing
fear of holdouts; and (3) dispute resolution.27 The sovereign bankruptcy
proposal drew a new wave of criticism from the intended market and sovereign
beneficiaries. Creditors worried generally about tilting the playing field in the
borrowers' direction, and suspected the IMF of a power grab.28 They forecasted
reduced capital flows and higher borrowing costs for governments, who then
joined in the protest. Many suspected the IMF would use SDRM to ease out of
expectations all clustered around one or two maverick litigants prompting other creditors to hold
out, a fact pattern that never quite panned out since the cooperative majority was happy to pay
the "maverick tax" to secure greater concessions from the debtor. See Kenneth Rogoff and
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankrupty Procedures for Sovereigns. A History of Ideas, 1976-2001 at 7-9, IMF
Working Paper No 02/133 (Aug 2002), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2002/wp02133.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005); William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati,
Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest ofCreditors, 57 Vand L Rev 1, 59-60 (2004).
25 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art VIII, § 2(b), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm#2> (visited Mar 22, 2005). Report of the
Working Group on International Financial Crises at 22 (cited in note 23), Safeguarding Prosperiy in a
Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture, Council on Foreign Relations
Task Force Report (1999), available online at <http://www.cfr.org/pub3233/
peter_.gpeterson carla ahillsmorrisgoldstein/safeguarding._prosperity_.n-aglobal financial
_systemthefuture-internationa financialarchitecture.php> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
26 Lee C. Buchheit, The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield, 9 Intl Fin L Rev 15 (Oct 1990); Anna
Gelpem, For Richer, For Poorer Sovereign Debt Contracts in Crisis, 1 J Intl Banking Reg 20, 25-29
(2000) (discussing sharing, trustees, barriers to acceleration, and enforcement); Fisch and Gentile,
53 Emory L J 1043 (cited in note 22); G-10 Working Group, Report of the G-10 Working Group on
Contractual Clauses, 3-4 (Sept 26, 2002), available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/
gten08.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005) (concerning the role of a trustee).
27 Krueger, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, International Financial Architecture for 2002: New
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (cited in note 23) and IMF, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: Prelminary Considerations (Nov 30, 2001), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/extemal/NP/pdr/sdrm/2001/113001.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005). See
also IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations (Nov 27,
2002), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf>
(visited Apr 15, 2005).
28 See Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt at 75--78 (cited in note 10).
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the bailout business. 29 For their part, rich countries worried privately that
reopening the IMF charter would invite more reform than anyone had bargained
for. In April 2003, the IMF Board officially shelved the proposal as politically
unfeasible.3°
Of the three elements in the original SDRM proposal, the first-a stay on
lawsuits-drew the most passionate advocates among the IMF shareholders and
the most passionate detractors in the markets. IMF staff spent nearly a year
going back and forth on whether and how to shield borrowers from legal action
and/or enforcement against their assets. One rejected option would have
blocked suits without requiring creditor consent to a stay.3' Another option
would have reduced a creditor's recovery under a restructuring agreement by the
amount of their lawsuit proceeds (the so-called hotchpot rule). A third option,
favored by the Board, would allow a majority of private creditors to block
enforcement by some or all private creditors for the sake of orderly restructuring
and intercreditor fairness.
To the credit of private and public participants in the SDRM debate, the
design of a litigation shield was debated openly and parsed carefully-perhaps
too carefully-along with other aspects of the IMF's proposal to minimize
intrusion into private contracts. It is ironic that only a month after the IMF
dropped its own delicate compromise under market pressure, the UN took
enforcement off the table for all creditors of Iraq without the intervening
politeness of creditor consultations, much less a majority vote.
But viewed from a different angle, immunizing Iraq's assets with a
combination of international agreement and US Executive Order was not radical
at all. After Iran agreed to release US hostages in 1981, Presidents Carter and
Reagan issued executive orders terminating, among other things, all lawsuits and
enforcement actions against Iranian property in the United States and
transferring all claims to the international tribunal in the Hague. The US
Supreme Court upheld the orders in Dames &Moore v Regan, 453 US 654 (1981),
as consistent with the President's powers to conclude international agreements
and with the economic emergency laws enacted by Congress. The advent of
restrictive sovereign immunity codified in the FSIA did not diminish the
President's power to settle US citizens' claims against foreign governments (as in
29 Id.
30 IMF, Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on the IMF's
Poliy Agenda (Apr 11, 2003), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
omd/2003/041103.htm> (visited on Apr 15, 2005).
31 IMF staff were concerned that while creditors would be barred from enforcement, nothing would
prevent the debtor from paying off its creditors selectively, fundamentally upsetting intercreditor
equity. Hagan, Designing a LegalFramework to Restructure Sovereign Debt at 53 (cited in note 10).
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the days of bondholder protective councils and gunboat diplomacy),32 and
certainly did not give creditors unconditional access to courts, especially where
an alternative forum was available.
The UN Security Council resolutions and US executive orders on Iraq
arguably stopped short of the Dames & Moore scenario. The new measures
mimicked the essential structure of the restrictive immunity compromise-
creditors remain free to go to court and get judgments, they just cannot enforce
them. It is even possible to argue that with these measures in place, Iraq and
Argentina are not that different from the enforcement perspective: most of
Iraq's foreign assets are immune, most of Argentina's have been privatized and
cannot be seized to satisfy the government's debts.
The lessons of this incident for the law of sovereign debt are threefold.
First, it is a reminder that the official sector has long had the tools to shield a
sovereign borrower from its creditors, even without a statutory sovereign
bankruptcy regime. In theory, the UN Security Council could use these tools
whenever its members agreed on a worthy debtor. In the wake of Resolution
1483, all the design activity surrounding the recent automatic stay proposals
looks strangely beside the point. It is significant that in the. case of Iraq,
policymakers chose the Security Council as the institutional vehicle for
bankruptcy administration. Even more than the IMF, the UN is seen by market
participants as biased in favor of sovereign debtors, ignorant of the complexities
of modern finance, and insensitive to market concerns. But the Security Council
is also the preeminent international institution for dealing with political crises of
global significance. Its recent firefighting activities notwithstanding, the IMF's
basic mandate is maintaining global financial stability.
Thus viewed against the background of Argentina's default and the demise
of the SDRM, the second lesson of Iraq appears to be that the international
community would step in to shield a government when its financial distress
presents an extraordinary political threat, but not when it stems from periodic
misfortune or mismanagement. Resolution 1483 and Executive Order 13,364
articulate the high standard for intervention under the UN Charter and US
law-for the UN, it is a "threat to international peace and security"; for the US,
an "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States.,
33
32 Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 683-84 (1981).
33 The relevant language is as follows: "Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved,
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security..." Security Council Res No
1483, UN Doc S/RES/1483, preamble (May 22, 2003) (cited in note 14). "[Tio address the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States
posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq ... I find that the threat of attachment or
other judicial process against the Central Bank of Iraq constitutes one of these obstacles." The
Vol. 6 No. 1
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But even in extraordinary political circumstances, governments worry that
endorsing a stay on enforcement would disrupt the markets. Iraq's debt structure
mitigated this worry-of the roughly $125 billion in external debt, more than
two thirds was owed to other governments (many sitting on the Security Council
and fielding coalition troops). Estimates of private debt were about $15 billion.
Most of this debt appeared to be in the hands of corporate creditors in Europe,
Asia, and Latin America-exporters and construction companies that did not
ordinarily trade in emerging markets debt, and did not have the institutional
power base of banks and bondholders on issues of sovereign debt
restructuring.34 In contrast, almost all of Argentina's debt was in the form of
actively traded bonds.
It might be tempting to read this incident as reaffirming the distinction
between Argentina and Iraq. Argentina and the sovereign bankruptcy proposals
it helped inspire argue for new rules to help resolve periodic, even routine
financial distress. Iraq is a unique political event that holds no lessons for the
bankruptcy project. But this distinction is exaggerated.
The ad hoc resolutions and orders shielding Iraq fall far short of an
intricate bankruptcy regime. They do not aspire to balance debtor and creditor
interests, to check debtor abuses, to empower the creditor collective, or even to
create procedures for private creditor participation in Iraq's restructuring. But
they do carve out a generous safe space for Iraq to rearrange its affairs, and even
try to create incentives for new financing.35 These measures require no new laws
or treaties, and, if seen as principled and truly exceptional, may not undermine
market discipline. Who needs a new regime?
This third lesson of Iraq may be its most significant: there already exist
elements of an international bankruptcy regime for sovereigns, including the
possibility of robust protection from creditor lawsuits. The threshold to invoke
the most robust form of protection is high--diplomatic consensus that financial
distress threatens international security. The existence of such a threat seems to
President, Exec Order 13364-Modifying the Protection Granted to the Development Fund for
Iraq and Certain Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest and Protecting the Central Bank of Iraq,
69 Fed Reg 70177, preamble (Nov 29, 2004) (cited in note 17).
34 See Those Odious Debts: Reconstructing Iraq, 369 Economist 13 (Oct 18, 2003); see also A Load Off?
Iraq's Debts, 373 Economist 98 (Nov 27, 2004). Other potentially important creditor groups
included reparations seekers and tort plaintiffs, such as US POWs that had been tortured in Iraq
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Bars POW Claims to FroZen Iraqi Assets,
Wash Post A16 (July 31, 2003).
35 See for example, Security Council Res No 1546, UN Doc S/RES/1546 S 27 (June 8, 2004) (cited
in note 14); see also The President, Exec Order 13364-Modifying the Protection Granted to the
Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest and Protecting
the Central Bank of Iraq, 69 Fed Reg 70177 § 1 (Nov 29, 2004) (cited in note 17) (exempting
from immunity judgments arising from contracts entered into after June 30, 2004).
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obviate the need for complex checks and balances inherent in a bankruptcy
system. Crossing the threshold entails the usual, inevitably messy political
process, no doubt favoring those debtor and creditor constituencies that already
enjoy the support of the rich and powerful UN members. But maybe this is a
more honest way to do it: more than any statutory bankruptcy proposal, the
existing machinery reaffirms the political nature of the state and its membership
in the messy, political community of states. At the very least, the Iraqi incident
recasts the sovereign bankruptcy debate in a way worth exploring. It puts the
politics of sovereign bankruptcy center stage, not as a sidebar to questions of
technical design.
III. ARGENTINA: ODIOUS DEBTS AND CUTOFF DATES
At this writing, over three quarters of Argentina's defaulted bond holders
have agreed to reduce the government's debt by about 70 percent in present
value terms using market discount rates. If last minute lawsuits do not derail the
restructuring, these creditors will receive about thirty-five billion dollars in new
bonds for sixty-two billion dollars in principal of the old debt in an offer
announced in January and due to complete in April. If Argentina follows
through on its promise to pay nothing to nonparticipating creditors (about
twenty billion dollars in principal), the total debt relief would be even more
impressive.
Argentina justified its offer in terms of its capacity to pay-it said it could
not afford to pay more without jeopardizing the housing, jobs, education, and
healthcare of Argentines.36 Some of its creditors disagreed vigorously;3 7 so far,
they appear to have lost.
Iraq has adopted a broadly similar approach. It has presented its creditors
with a theory of its payment capacity, and has argued for debt relief consistent
with that theory.38 Thanks to all out US diplomacy, Iraq has secured a reduction
of 80 percent in principal and past due interest from the Paris Club of
government lenders, and promised the Paris Club to seek comparable relief from
the rest of its creditors.
36 Discurso del Sehor Presidente de la Nacidn Doctor Nestor Kircbner ante la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa 10
(May 25, 2003) (Inaugural Address of President Kirchner, Buenos Aires), available online at
<http://www.argentina-canada.net/discurso.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005), English translation
available in Argentina: Full Text of Kircbner's Inaugural Speech, BBC Monitoring International Reports
(May 26, 2003).
37 Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, available online at <http://www.gcab.org> (visited
Apr 15, 2005).
38 Interview with Adil Abdul Mahdi, Minister of Finance in the interim government of Iraq,
Restructuring Debt is Top Priorihy, transcript available in Felix Salmon, Seeking Forgiveness of Saddam-era
Debt, 35 Euromoney 72, 76 (Sept 2004).
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Debt relief based on capacity to pay was not the only, and not necessarily
the obvious approach for Iraq. Some Iraqi politicians, international NGOs, and
their allies (notably including Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle) have argued
passionately that Iraq must repudiate its debt as illegitimate because it was
incurred under Saddam Hussein. The NGOs have also argued for an
international tribunal where in order to get paid, creditors would have to prove
that their funds benefited the Iraqi people."
Under this approach, based on the public international law doctrine of
Odious Debt, the amount of debt and payment capacity are essentially irrelevant.
Relief derives from the manner in which the debt was incurred. The debt is
unenforceable and a government may repudiate it unilaterally if: (1) the people
did not consent to the borrowing; (2) the proceeds did not benefit the people;
and (3) the creditor knew (1) and (2) when lending.4" These elements are central
to the definitive restatement of the doctrine by Alexander Sack, an early
twentieth century scholar:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the
State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that
fights against it,... this debt is odious for the population of all the State....
This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime's debt, a personal
debt of the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of
this power .... "Odious" debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the
knowledge of the creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not
compromise the latter-in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of
the government which incurs them-except to the extent that real
advantages were obtained from these debts. The creditors have committed a
hostile act with regard to the people; they can't therefore expect that a
nation freed from a despotic power assume the "odious" debts, which are
personal debts of that power.41
Sack's treatise moved to institutionalize earlier invocations of the concept
of illegitimate "imposed" or "hostile" debts, notably the US diplomatic position
39 Preliminagy Structural and Procedural Aspects of Iraq Tribunal, available online at
<http://www.jubileeiraq.org/tribunal.htm> (visited Apr 17, 2005).
40 See, for example, Center for International Sustainable Development Law, Advandg the Odious
Debt Doctrine 13-21, CISDL Working Paper No COM/RES/ESJ (Mar 11, 2003), available online
at <http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/ debtentire.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005); Anupam Chander, Odious
Securitizafion, 53 Emory LJ 923 (2004) and Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt
1 (Apr 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
res/seminars/2002/ poverty/mksj.pdf> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
41 Alexander N. Sack, Les Effets des Traniformations des Etats sur leurs Detes Publiques etAutres Obligations
Financieres (Recueil Sirey 1927), translated in Patricia Adams, Odious Debts: Loose Lendinv. Crnrrutinnn
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on Spain's cession of Cuba after the Spanish-American War, as part of the law
of state succession.42
The law of government (as distinct from state) succession is settled-
revolutions notwithstanding, "the nation remains with rights and obligations
unimpaired. ' 43 The law of state succession is more murky. The classic case of
state succession involves the passage of territory between state powers.
Revenues from the territory often specifically secure earlier borrowing by the
ceding power, and even where there is no specific pledge, the loss of territory
might affect the ceding state's debt payment capacity. To release the ceding state
from its obligation to pay, the acquiring state (a new colonial ruler or a newly
independent state) often must take the affirmative step of assuming the debt.
The new state may resist the assumption, especially where debt proceeds paid
for conquest and oppression, or less dramatically financed the general needs of
the old empire unconnected with the territory in question.
The US-Spanish dispute concerned debts contracted by the Spanish Crown
in its own name but secured by Cuban revenues. A large portion of the proceeds
went to finance the suppression of uprisings in Cuba, San Domingo (now the
Dominican Republic), and Mexico. After the Spanish-American War, Spain
wanted the debt to follow the revenue pledge, and pressed for its assumption by
the newly independent Cuban state. In response, the US advanced technical
arguments to the effect that debts do not cede with territory and revenue
pledges are not mortgages. The US also argued that the debts were illegitimate
because the Cubans had not actually agreed to the borrowing, and the proceeds
did not benefit Cuba. In 1931, a leading sovereign debt scholar of the day
described the second set of arguments as not "strictly legal" but rather "in
accordance with fairness and justice." Spain specifically rejected the US position
when it gave up demanding that Cuba assume the Spanish debt as part of "a
compromise deviating from strict international law [in return for] certain
compensations. 44
Europe's military adventures of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries produced several other treaties that specified the treatment of debts in
cases of territorial conquest.45 The conquering state often assumed some or all of
42 See Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, Public Debts and State Succession 337 (MacMillan 1931); see also John
Basset Moore, A Digest of International Law § 97 at 359 (Govt Printing Office 1906).
43 Lehigh Valley R Co v State of Russia, 21 F2d 396, 401 (2d Cir 1927); Great Britain v Costa Rica, (1923)
1 RIAA 375 (1923) (Tinoco arbitration).
44 Feilchenfeld, Pub/ic Debts and State Succession at 337, 339, 343 (cited in note 42).
45 P.K. Menon, The Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, State Propery, Archives, and Debts, 6 Studies in
World Peace 1, 162-63 (Edwin Mellon 1991); see also Feilchenfeld, Public Debts and State Succession
at 104, 182, 393-95 (cited in note 42).
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the debts associated with the acquired territory, but the specific arrangements
varied widely. Some countries notably had refused to assume "war debts" where
the proceeds were used to fight them. The British advanced this argument
against the Netherlands South African Railway Company for supporting the
Dutch in the Boer wars at the turn of the twentieth century. The outcome in this
case reflects a common pattern: the state that prevailed in the military conflict
also chose the debt arrangements. Even so, the British legal position was
controversial: "This opinion of the British government was not supported by
any precedent in the history of state succession and was not accepted by foreign
46powers.
Decolonization since World War II did little to clarify the rules of state
succession with respect to debts: arrangements were entirely case specific, and
state practice was all over the map.4" Sack's Odious Debt principle, articulated
on the eve of the war, seemed to lose ground in the state practice that followed.
The high bar for showing state succession may be one reason why the
Odious Debt Doctrine has had trouble taking root in public international law.48
The extent to which "regime change"-such as the Russian revolution, the end
of military rule in Argentina, and the exits of Ferdinand Marcos and Saddam
Hussein-amounts to state succession is an open question. These cases all
involve a profound shift in the nature of the borrowing state without the
transfer of territory. US case law and international precedent specifically
addressing revolutions would make it difficult to establish state succession based
on a new form of government or the deposing of a tyrant. 49 The practical burden
also shifts in the case of regime change-unlike the Cuban-Spanish and British-
Dutch scenarios, no treaty or other affirmative act of assumption is needed to
transfer obligations to the new regime-since nominally, the debtor is the same.
46 Id at 394-95.
47 P.K. Menon, an advocate for the Odious Debt Doctrine, notes that
[tihe practice of the newly independent States after the establishment of the
United Nations is singularly marked with inconsistency and contradiction. It is
not dictated by any uniformly accepted legal principle. There are precedents
both in favour of succession and against it, and even in cases of repudiation of
debts after their acceptance...
Menon, The Succession of States at 184-85 (cited in note 45).
48 The authors of Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine argue that state succession is not a necessary
element of the Odious Debt Doctrine, citing Tinoco. Center for International Sustainable
Development Law, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine at 13-21, (cited in note 40). This argument
may work as advocacy for a new doctrine incorporating principles of fiduciary duty and standards
of fraud in sovereign borrowing under international law, but they are at odds with all the writing
nd p,. pl.,c.itiLy a cubbiig die Odious Debt Doctrine.
4 See for example Lehigh Valley R Co v State of Russia, 21 F2d 396, 401 (2d Cir 1927); see also Great
Britain v Costa Rica, (1923) 1 RIAA 375.
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To get out of paying, the new regime must repudiate the debts booked in its
name, and assert a fundamental change in its identity and/or the odious
character of the debts as a defense for the repudiation. If the defense succeeds,
the debt is extinguished, not transferred to another state obligor.
As it happens, no national or international tribunal has ever cited Odious
Debt as grounds for invalidating a sovereign obligation. Each of the treaties and
other examples of state practice cited even by the doctrine's most thorough and
principled advocates appears fundamentally flawed-it lacks one or more of the
doctrine's essential elements and/or is accompanied by a chorus of specific
disavowals of the doctrine by indispensable parties."0 But even if the examples
were on point, the fact that Odious Debt's most fervent proponents to this day
must cite an 1898 treaty and a 1923 arbitration as their best authorities suggests
that the law-making project is in trouble.5'
Odious Debt's apparent disuse and disarray after a century of Hitler, Stalin,
Mobutu, Abacha, Somoza, Marcos and Idi Amin-not to mention the socialist
revolutions, capitalist restorations, and the intervening wars of liberation from
colonial rule-are more than mildly puzzling. Most recently, the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein revived the hopes for resurrecting the Odious Debt Doctrine. 2
But when given the opportunity to invoke it, the new Iraqi authorities demurred:
Iraq's need for very substantial debt relief derives from the economic
realities facing a post-conflict country that has endured decades of financial
corruption and mismanagement under the Saddam regime. Principles of
public international law such as the odious debt doctrine, whatever their
legal vitality, are not the reason why Iraq is seeking this relief.53
Assuming for argument's sake that the decision not to invoke Odious Debt
was Iraq's own, why would the country shun a doctrine that seems so hospitable
50 See, for example, Center for International Sustainable Development Law, Advancing the Odious
Debt Doctrine at 21-30 (cited in note 40). The authors' suggestion that the US refusal to apportion
to Cuba Spanish debt secured by Cuban revenues is a "perfect" fit for the doctrine is puzzling
considering Spain's specific protest and the compensation it evidently got in return for keeping its
debt.
For other examples of scholarly writing supporting the existence of an Odious Debt Doctrine, see
Menon, The Succession of States at 161-66 (cited in note 45).
51 See Patricia Adams, Odious Debts: Loose Lendin& Comption, and the Third World's Environmental Legagy
162-170 (Probe 1991), excerpted online at <http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/
index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&ArealD=3> (visited Apr 15, 2005) and Center for International
Sustainable Development Law, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine at 21-30 (cited in note 40).
52 For general discussion, see <http://www.jubileeiraq.org>; <http://www.odiousdebts.org>. The
Jubilee site contains links to a vast array of editorial opinion, most of it supporting the Odious
Debt Doctrine and its application to Iraq.
53 Interview with Adil Abdul Mahdi, Minister of Finance in the interim government of Iraq,
Restructuring Debt is Top Prioriy, transcript available in Felix Salmon, Seeking Forgiveness of Saddam-era
Debt, 35 Euromoney at 76 (cited in note 38).
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to its cause? The costs of invoking Odious Debt to the country are roughly the
same as with any other sovereign debt repudiation: the cost of dodging
enforcement (discussed in the first half of this essay) and damage to reputation.
54
Debt repudiation could tarnish the country's good name in the private credit
markets and even among government lenders just when the new government
needs them the most. Even if the new government convinces the creditors that
it is fundamentally a different entity from the one that had borrowed the money,
is therefore not breaking its own promises, and would not make repudiation a
habit, they might fear the political risk of future succession or regime change.
On the other hand, the benefits of invoking Odious Debt are debt relief
combined with moral and political redress for the wrongs of a bad regime. How
the doctrine is implemented matters as well: if creditors are allowed to challenge
the odious designation before a special tribunal or a even a national court, a
comprehensive debt settlement may take many years and validate some creditor
claims.
Others have written about the costs of invoking Odious Debt and ways to
mitigate them within the doctrine's framework. 5 I suggest that countries often
are able to get the same debt reduction benefit at a lower cost by going outside
the doctrine and framing their decision as a financial restructuring, a
composition rather than as repudiation. Iraq is a particularly good example: the
debt default happened while Saddam Hussein was under international sanctions.
The new government has the choice of effectively defaulting again by publicly
repudiating most of the old obligations, or negotiating deep debt reduction to
"normalize" its relations with creditors.
Argentina's experience is instructive. It defaulted on its international bonds
in the last days of 2001, when it went through four presidents and abandoned its
currency peg to the dollar. In the next six months, its currency lost almost three-
quarters of its value, its Central Bank reserves dropped by half, and its people
took to the streets.5 6 In the next three years, unpaid past-due interest on the
54 See, for example, Bratton and Gulati, 57 Vand L Rev at 14-16 (cited in note 24), for a concise
summary of the Reputation and Enforcement Theories of sovereign debt. There are additional
costs of debt default, as distinct from repudiation after default; these are mostly concentrated in
domestic economic dislocation, bank runs, and so on.
55 Kremer and Jayachandran, Odious Debt at 6 (cited in note 40) and Center for International
Sustainable Development Law, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine at 36-39 (cited in note 40).
6 The Republic ofArgentina, Prospectus Supplement Dated Jan 10, 2005 and Prospectus Dated Dec 27, 2004,
filedpursuant to Rule 424(b)(5) under the US Securities Act of 1933, Registration No 333-117111 at 42,
46-47, 107,, available online at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/
000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm#108> (visited Apr 16, 2005). The peso went from-1:1
USL) to a low of 3.87:1 USD on June 26, 2002 - 74.2 percent. Id at 42, 107. Real GDP (adjusted




Chicago Journal of International Law
defaulted debt grew to twenty billion dollars. The government's name was mud
with international investors and with much of its own citizenry.
While deeply traumatic and occasionally violent, Argentina's political break
in 2001 would hardly even qualify as regime change. The government borrowed
most of the money under President Carlos Saul Menem of the same Justicialist
(Peronist) party as interim President Eduardo Duhalde and current President
Nestor Kirchner. Yet President Kirchner has repeatedly called the old debt
"illegitimate" and blamed Argentina's creditors for financing bad policies that
hurt its people.57
Within months of the default, the Argentine authorities began issuing new
debt even as they publicly committed not to repay the old.58 The government
framed the distinction between the old defaulted and new performing debt in
terms of cutoff dates.59 The cutoff date concept was popular in the early days of
the modern sovereign workout practice. In government-to-government (Paris
Club) and commercial bank (London Club) agreements of the 1980s, cutoff
dates protected "new money," presumably advanced for the debtor's recovery
on the model of postpetition financing in domestic bankruptcy." Old (pre
cutoff) debt was rescheduled or reduced; new (post cutoff) debt was spared.6
57 Larry Rohter, Argentina PressedforQuick Action, Intl Herald Trib 14 (May 20, 2003). In his inaugural
address, Kirchner said "We cannot go back to paying our debts at the expense of hunger and
exclusion of Argentines [applause] generating more poverty and increasing social conflicts ....
The unfeasibility [sic] of this old model must be noticed by the creditors themselves who must
understand that they can only collect if Argentina does well." Argentina: Full Text of Kirchner's
Inaugural Speech (cited in note 36).
58 For a detailed account of Argentina's debt management immediately before and after the default,
see The Republic of Aqgentina, Prospectus Supplement Dated Jan 10, 2005 and Prospectus Dated Dec 27,
2004, filed pursuant to Rule 424(b)(5) under the US Securities Act of 1933, Registration No 333-117111
at 165-74 (cited in note 56). Anna Gelpern and Brad Setser, Domestic Debt and the Doomed Quest for
Equal Treatment, Georgetown J Intl L (forthcoming 2005) (on file with author). Most of the new
securities went to cover the capital deficit in domestic financial institutions and to buy back the
scrip issued by Argentine provinces in the dying days of the dollar peg. The government said the
new securities were "senior" and exempt from restructuring. International investors believed it
and promptly started scrambling for the few new bonds that were allowed to trade. Foreign
investors believed rationally-and correctly so far-that the Argentine government would not
default on the debt held primarily in its financial system, risking another bank run and broader
economic shock that might follow.
59 See, for example, Guillermo Nielson, Secretary of Finance, Agentina's Restructuring Guidelines,
Remarks to Argentine creditors in Dubai (Sept 22, 2003), available online at
<http: //www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentos/discurso-gndubai-con-diap-english.pdf>
(visited Apr 15, 2005).
60 See, for example, 11 USC § 507 (2000). See Paris Club, Cutoff date, available online at
<hrtp://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=BO1WP05> (visited
Apr 15, 2005). Lee C. Buchheit, Whatever Became of Old New Money?, 9 Intl Fin L Rev 11, 11-12
(1990). Buchheit suggests that most new money advanced in the 1980s was a thinly disguised way
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Started as an incentive to keep lending, cutoff dates also can naturally mark
a political breaking point-for Iraq, the Paris Club cutoff date is May 22, 2003,
the date of UN Security Council Resolution 1483; for many countries of Eastern
Europe the dates roughly track their departure from state socialism.6 2 Even
though as a matter of contract practice, cutoff dates have been losing favor in
sovereign workouts,63 Argentina's revival of cutoff date rhetoric to draw a bright
line between the bad debts of the old regime and the good debts of the new
made eminent political sense.
In the same inaugural address where he pledged not to repay the old debts
"at the expense of hunger and exclusion", President Kirchner declared a new
political and economic era. He promised to redress both the human rights
abuses of the military rule (1976-1983) and the corrupt, unfair economic policies
of the 1990s, which had "condemn[ed] millions of Argentines to social
exclusion, national fragmentation and the huge and endless foreign debt."
Rhetorically, debt relief went hand in hand with purges of the military and of the
judiciary.'
Declaring the old debts illegitimate constrained the government on the one
hand, and strengthened its negotiating position on the other. The strategy was a
constraint because having condemned the debt, the President now had to
explain to the voters why he was offering to pay anything at all to the creditors.
It strengthened Argentina's hand in the workout because foreign creditors
believed this domestic constraint to be substantially binding, and therefore
believed that Argentina would stay in default for a long time rather than improve
its aggressive restructuring offer. For the restructuring to succeed both
of financing interest payments on old rescheduled debt. In turn, new money made the already
unsustainable debt stocks more so.
61 See id; see also <http://www.clubdeparis.org>.
62 Id.
63 In London Club, their credibility suffered as debtors kept coming back for new new money, and
old new money had to be restructured. The Paris Club's problem was the precise opposite of the
London Club: because it refused to move its cutoff dates when the debtors came back for more
relief, it had had to keep cutting the same old debts over and over again as the new debts
ballooned. Recently most private sovereign debt has been restructured in bond exchanges, which
tend to use other techniques to distinguish between old and new debt.
64 Argentina: Full Text of Kirchner's Inaugural Speech (cited in note 36); Larry Rohrer, Letter from South
America: Now the Dirtiest of Wars Won't Be Forgotten, NY Times A4 Oune 18, 2003); Hector Tobar,
Agentina's New President Cleans House, LA Times 3 (June 5, 2003); The Empoy-HandedSoialDemocrat
The Economist (May 31, 2003). In November 2004, Argentina's Congress debated legislation
designating the debt incurred during the last military dictatorship (1976-83) odious and subject to
repudiation. This debt amounts to about thirty-eight billion dollars, nominally a little less than half
of the principal amount now in default, although much of it was likely reduced or rescheduled
during the 1990s. See Agentine Congress to debate Odious debt bill (Nov 13, 2004), available online at
<http://www.jubileeiraq.org/blog/2004_1 .html> (visited Apr 15, 2005).
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financially and politically, the majority of bondholders had to see the terms as
acceptable, and at the same time the voters had to see them as punitive. The
results so far-76 percent participation in the exchange-suggest that the
gamble paid off for the most part. On the other hand, the harsh terms and even
harsher rhetoric kept an unprecedented amount of debt (over twenty billion
dollars) out of the exchange, potentially threatening the outcome.
Argentina's example suggests that governments still enjoy considerable
discretion in selecting the debts they pay and those they seek to restructure.
While Argentina's finances are clearly strained, it is not chronically impoverished
like the countries of sub Saharan Africa. If this middle income country could
reduce the old debt by over 50 percent in a matter of months, then surely a
poorer middle income country like Iraq could aspire to do as well or better
without invoking the wobbly doctrine of Odious Debt.
The conventional approach may look even more attractive next to the
prospect of a special tribunal proposed by the NGOs to sort through Iraq's
debts. That tribunal would follow the model established after the settlement of
the Iran hostage crisis. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Hague took decades
to sift through each claim against Iran. Against this background, the three year
period between Argentina's default and its exchange offer announcement looks
positively brisk. In the case of Iraq, the tribunal might not even yield more relief
than the conventional approach because it might unearth billions of dollars in
"nonodious" claims.
If Argentina succeeds, it will show in graphic terms that most countries
considering Odious Debt have ready alternatives for securing deep debt relief
without proving state succession, illegitimacy, or specific knowledge by the
creditors, and without costly and time-consuming claim-by-claim adjudication.
The country's bargaining position in restructuring negotiations seems to
strengthen after it has suffered the initial domestic and external damage from
default-creditors' expectations of full repayment diminish as the government
has to justify resumption of any payment to it citizens. Against this background,
domestic proclamations of illegitimacy couched in the language of cutoff dates
may not be as good as international recognition of illegitimacy, but may be
worth the cost savings of going the conventional route.
IV. A DOCTRINAL GAP
The previous section suggests why governments seeking quick debt relief
and market access might bypass the Odious Debt Doctrine. But it also leaves
important questions unanswered and points to gaps in the law governing state
and government succession with respect to debts. An inquiry limited to financial
restructuring fails to address those aspirations of the Odious Debt Doctrine that
go beyond debt relief. The doctrine's other, perhaps more important goals-to
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discourage lending to thieves and tyrants, and to promote justice and healing
after their overthrow-have no part in the conventional approach. First, it is
worth examining alternative approaches to canceling dictators' debts based on
their illegitimacy, rather than the country's capacity to pay. Such an alternative
would help countries that could not get debt relief based on their incapacity to
pay. These countries are also the most likely to have market access and worry
about losing it with debt repudiation. Second, this section asks whether there is a
way to improve on the current Odious Debt Doctrine in providing ex ante
incentives against lending to tyrants.
The emphasis on state (as distinct from government) succession in Sack's
restatement of the Odious Debt Doctrine, while historically grounded in the
concept of hostile debts, is somewhat artificial. The doctrine's three elements-
lack of consent, lack of benefit, and creditor awareness--could be found even
where the borrowing state is unchanged. After all, sanctions against
unauthorized activities by corporate and other agents, to which "odious"
borrowing is occasionally compared, do not require substitution of the principal
entity.6" A government that repudiates the debts of a bad regime may argue that
these had been contracted without proper authority and were otherwise
fraudulent as a defense before a national court or an international tribunal.
In the 1923 Tinoco arbitration concerning Costa Rica's debts, the sole
arbitrator (former President and US Chief Justice William H. Taft) based his
ruling essentially on the common law notion of fraud. Taft went to great lengths
to establish that the ascent to power and demise of military strongman Frederico
Tinoco did not qualify as state succession. Taft then devoted much of his
opinion reaffirming the rule of government succession in the debts of their
predecessors. He nevertheless ratified Costa Rica's unilateral repudiation of
Tinoco's debt to the Royal Bank of Canada (represented by Great Britain in the
arbitration) on the grounds that the entire loan transaction reeked of fraud. The
Bank had accepted what it knew to be phony currency as collateral for what it
knew to be personal loans to Tinoco and his brother on the eve of their escape
from Costa Rica. Even though the Bank knew full well that the loan was
personal, it booked it as a state loan and tried to enforce it as such.66
The case is unusual in the line of examples usually cited in support of
Odious Debt in that Taft examines the underlying transaction (rather than
regime legitimacy) in great detail. Taft can dispense with the requirement of state
succession because he focuses on the transaction to the exclusion of the regime.
65 See Center for International Sustainable Development Law, Advandng the Odious Debt Doctrine at
36-39 , (ccd in nowc 40); :..... n ...... J yL.i._ d , Od n. Dr' .a 1-2 (6cd not. e 40).
66 In another part of his opinion (concerning an oil concession), Taft points out that Tinoco's own
government could have walked away from the obligations at issue.
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His opinion (which preceded widespread adoption of sovereign immunity and
sovereign debt litigation in national courts) points to the potential for the wider
use of more established domestic-law counterparts to Odious Debt and for
establishing standards of good faith in sovereign lending under international
law. 6
7
Tinoco also illustrates the challenge of invoking notions of fraud and
unauthorized borrowing from the perspective of debt relief advocacy. As with
the claims tribunal discussed in the last section, it would be impossible to deliver
large-scale relief quickly where an arbiter or a national court had to evaluate the
use of proceeds for every loan contract. An approach based on Tinoco may work
for countries with only a few bad loans, or those for whom speedy resolution of
the fraudulent debts is not essential-for example, wealthy countries that can
borrow despite these debts or poor countries without any prospect of market
access even after the debts are resolved.
The Odious Debt Doctrine as formulated by Sack is at its weakest in
creating effective ex ante incentives against lending to bad regimes. With all its
force directed at ex post repudiation and without a clear track record of practice,
the Odious Debt Doctrine in its current state offers no meaningful guidance to
shape decisions on lending to the emerging markets. Investors who lent to Iraq
relying on the now famous pictures of US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld with
Saddam Hussein would have been sorely disappointed. On the other hand, those
that stayed away from Indonesia under Suharto and Mexico under the PRI
might have made the wrong call too. Investors considering Venezuelan debt
today would be truly confused. One response might be to hire democracy and
civil society consultants to do the infinite investigations and issue "odiousness
opinions"; an easier one would be to shut down lending or raise the cost of
funds for all but the richest industrial countries.68
An economic model of odious debt recently proposed by Michael Kremer
and Seema Jayachandran seeks to address the problem of ex ante lending
incentives. Kremer and Jayachandran suggest that there are two ways in which
creditors can determine in advance whether a regime is odious-by engaging in
"an infinite sequence of costly investigations" or by relying on the judgment of
an independent institution.69 In their model, the institution is more likely to
67 Establishing such a standard could add to the still modest arsenal of tools to battle official
corruption and kleptocracy. See Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The
Fight against Money Laundering 148-56 (Inst Ind Econ 2004).
68 It might be possible to avoid branding a regime if a creditor is prepared to monitor the use of
loan proceeds to establish actual benefit to the population. That too might be costly, but more
importantly, it would embed foreign private creditors deeply in domestic policymaking for all or
most emerging markets, even those that do not turn out to be odious.
69 Kremer and Jayachandran, Odious Debt at 13, 15-16, 20 (cited in note 40).
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render unbiased judgments if its mandate is limited to declaring future lending as
odious, in effect putting creditors on notice before they advance the funds,
rather than ratifying repudiation."0
The authors recast Sack's doctrine as a sanctions regime. They would
empower an international institution to designate odious regimes in a process
similar to the well-established one now used to impose trade sanctions. National
courts would then refuse to enforce debt contracts with odious governments
(signed after their designation), while national and international aid agencies
would refuse to finance countries repaying odious debts. Although the aid
penalty seems excessive and impractical (no aid agency would punish a good
government merely for repaying the debts of a despot), the institutional design
challenge is no greater than in the case of trade sanctions, and the overall
framework is sensible and innovative.
Turning Odious Debt into a form of sanctions would remove some
reputational damage to a country from repudiating odious debt, would shield the
country from lawsuits, and would enable meaningful risk assessment by
creditors. Most importantly, it may discourage lending to oppressive
governments and free their people from responsibility for the debts.7'
V. CONCLUSION
I have used the examples of Iraq and Argentina to make two arguments.
First, I suggest that the existing toolkit for sovereign debt restructuring is even
more versatile than is generally supposed. The recent UN Security Council
Resolutions on Iraq show that the international community has extraordinary
capacity to shield sovereign debtors from lawsuits even without a statutory
sovereign bankruptcy regime, though it uses the most extreme measures only
rarely. If last minute lawsuits do not derail Argentina's restructuring, its ability to
secure deep reduction of the debts contracted under the Menem government
will show how much a sovereign debtor can achieve with straightforward
financial restructuring tools without resorting to complex and untested public
law doctrines such as Odious Debt.
70 Id at 20-26. Allowing the institution to ratify repudiation would encourage it to act on its biases.
One that is prodebtor might call legitimate regimes odious just to obtain debt relief; a procreditor
institution might let bad regimes slide to maximize repayment. Political and geographic biases
would produce similar results. On the other hand, an institution favoring debtors would hesitate
to call a good regime odious at the lending stage for fear of slowing capital flows to its
constituents; one that favors creditors might be less reluctant to call an odious regime before the
investors have advanced the funds and exposed themselves to the risk of repudiation.
71 Kremer and Jayachandran also show that financial sanctions on their Odious Debt model would
work better than the widely used trade sanctions: unlike trade sanctions, financial sanctions hurt
the rulers more than they hurt the people, and are less prone to abuse by third parties.
Summer 2005
Geoern
Chicago Journal of International Law
Second, Iraq and Argentina highlight the obvious point that is often
ignored by debt relief advocates and technocrats alike-it is impossible to
separate politics and finance in sovereign workouts; both are central and neither
is a sideshow. While the IMF was busy designing a complex sovereign
restructuring mechanism, the UN Security Council simply shielded an important
country from its creditors. Political imperatives preempted the emergence of a
legal regime. On the other hand, even if most see Iraq as a case of power
politics, its decision to follow the conventional model of financial restructuring
puts it in the line of cases resolved based on the debtor's payment capacity, with
all the methodological and procedural baggage it implies. In a sense, financial
pragmatism prevailed over succession politics. But Argentina's decision to call its
defaulted debt illegitimate created a set of political constraints that profoundly
affected its restructuring outcome.
A separate but related point is that financial relief alone is often
insufficient in the case of emerging market sovereign debt. Countries have debt
problems when they suffer external shocks through no fault of their own, when
their governments mismanage the national economy, and when their
governments borrow in the name of the people only to oppress them and steal
from them. Private financial restructuring techniques can rearrange a country's
liabilities, but are ill-suited to fight mismanagement, oppression and looting. The
public international law doctrine of Odious Debt has languished because it is an
inefficient tool for securing quick debt relief; it also fails to provide ex ante
incentives against lending to tyrants. Instead of turning to Odious Debt, many
countries emerging from oppressive regimes have sought deep debt relief using a
combination of conventional financial technique and radical political rhetoric.
But this approach does little to prevent lending to bad rulers, and is an indirect
way of redressing it ex post. Reframing the Odious Debt Doctrine as an ex ante
sanctions system along the lines proposed by Kremer and Jayachandran is a
promising step that seeks to combine financial and political tools sensibly to
fight bad regimes and do right by the people they have oppressed.
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